A Plea for a Law of Interpretation by Silving, Helen
A PLEA FOR A LAW OF INTERPRETATION
By HELEN SILVING t
Legal interpretation raises three basic questions: What is the na-
ture of rules of interpretation? Are rules of interpretation effective,
i.e., do they facilitate the administration of justice? Are they desir-
able?
The first mentioned question would seem to presuppose a defini-
tion of the term "interpretation," and this position of the problem
leads at once into the core of the entire set of questions. Does "inter-
pretation" mean the same in law as it does in other fields of social
expression, such as science, religion, literature, or art?
Interpretation is specification of meaning, but at law it is always
at the same time application of meaning, procedure, action. This is
true even in cases of "abstract interpretation," i.e., in those cases in
which interpretation does not dispose of a concrete case but sets forth
an exposition of meaning to be applied in potential future cases.' In
law, interpretation is "binding," 2 whether binding in a case at bar or
in a class of future cases. The binding force of legal interpretation
disposes of the question of whether such interpretation is right or
wrong, true or false. When binding, interpretation is right and true,
whether or not it would be otherwise right or true. The validity of
legal interpretation-in contrast to other types of interpretation--does
not depend on the intrinsic soundness of the interpretative proposition
but is governed by external, formal standards-the legal rules of
interpretation. The very scope and meaning of the concept of legal
interpretation are determined by such legal rules. Thus, the initial
problem posed above is reversed: In law, rules of interpretation are
the primary idea, and "interpretation" merely their derivative.
It is hoped to show that when assuming the form of binding legal
provisions, rules of interpretation are effective in the sense of affording
guidance to those entrusted with the function of interpretation, and
that the effectiveness of such rules is not limited as is that of non-legal
interpretative rules.
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. Abstract interpretation is admissible in international law. See particularly the
opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of Polish Upper
Silesia (Ser. A, No. 7, at 18, 19). In national laws interpretation determines only con-
crete controversies, and in the American law abstract interpretation by courts is un-
constitutional, for it violates the principle of separation of powers.
2. The term "binding" is used here in a specifically legal sense. Biblical inter-
pretation may be also regarded as binding, but outside of the field of Church law, it is
binding only upon the conscience of the believer.
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It is further proposed to show that adoption of legal rules of in-
terpretation is, at least in the field of statutory law, desirable.
THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION
The nature of legal interpretation has been a constant subject of
juristic attention. Traditional conceptions of its meaning and func-
tion, however, rarely assume it to be law. They are rather divided
into two groups: (1) one which regards it as an art to be discovered
intuitively; (2) the other which regards it as a science proceeding
according to a particular scientific method. Whereas the first group
considers interpretation to be free, the second claims it to be subject
to rules of method, logical rules. The problem as thus formulated
also has been discussed as one involving a choice between judicial
freedom of decision and legislative intention, and the general tendency
at present is toward the former's expansion.
The traditional "science" of interpretation, consisting of a collec-
tion of principles of interpretation or rather of interpretative wisdom,
is at present overwhelmingly rejected. Efforts to reconcile these fre-
quently conflicting principles on logical grounds and thus to arrive at
a system of interpretation failed.
Modern attempts at formulating a sociological science of inter-
pretation, i.e., one which emphasizes sociological factors, cannot develop
beyond theoretical speculations as long as the prevailing rules of
procedure are maintained. Judge Frank in opinions and other writ-
ings ' demonstrated this shortcoming of present law. In the absence
of access to sociological material and of an accepted method of judicial
sociology, whatever sociology may be invoked in decisions easily can
be shown to be judicial arbitrariness, or as is sometimes said with
candor, a judicial hunch. The advocates of a sociological science of
interpretation are those proponents of the freedom of judicial decision
who somehow hesitate to admit it to be entirely free. "Sociological
interpretation" is a line of thought similar to that which advocates
weighing of interests by judges. When carried into practice, weigh-
ing of interests can be demonstrated to amount partly to a weighing
of imponderables and partly to subsequent justifications of conclusions
foreclosed before the problems at issue arose.4 The same is corre-
spondingly true of sociological interpretation.
3. See particularly Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation,
47 COL. L. REv. 1259, 1265 (1947), and the decision cited there. Cf. also Judge Frank's
dissent in Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (1947) and his concurring opinion
in Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788, 790 et seq. (1949).
4. Berolzheimer, The Perils of Emotionalism, in SciENcE OF LEGAL METHOD 166
et seq. (1921) points out the historical fallacy of the theory of the "adjustment of in-
terests."
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The proposition that interpretation is an art 5 is frequently but
a counterpart or another version of the statement that interpretation
is not a science, hence not subject to definite rules. At other times,
the assertion that interpretation is an art is intended to convey the
idea of "intuitive interpretation," and such interpretation is not al-
ways regarded as tantamount to "free interpretation." It presupposes
a mental or emotional contact between legislator and judge, which
causes the latter to "feel" rather than to understand the message con-
veyed by the former.' The context of the words, their background,
occasion, environment, etc., are said to play a role in transmitting the
message and to afford guidance. But these elements are inchoate and
incapable of generalization. 7
The proposition advanced in this paper is that though legal in-
terpretation may be scientific or artistic, neither science nor art is its
ultimate source. It is rather ultimately governed by rules of law which
determine "meaning" at law, and that includes the meaning of "mean-
ing" itself.
At law, language is always used, in a sense, as "code" language. s
The meaning of legally relevant conceptions, even of those derived
5. On the subject of interpretation as an art see particularly Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COL L. REv. 527 (1947), and Frank, Words
and Music, etc., supra, note 3.
6. For the proposition that the meaning of a sentence is to be felt rather than to
be proved, see Mr. Justice Holmes in United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 496
(1911).
7. In his last book, VoM STIL DES RECHTS, BEITRAEGE ZU EINER AEsTHETIK DES
RECHTS (1947), p. 20, Triepel pointed out that apart from Herbart's theory basing
law on an esthetic "displeasure invoked by discord," no attempt has been made at
specifying the meaning of the statement that law is an art or has an esthetic "side".
Of course, Triepel was not acquainted with American law and literature.
Comparisons of the interpretation of law with that of works of art are important
contributions to the theory of culture. However, they cannot serve practical needs of
legal interpretation so long as our knowledge of the meaning expressed in the various
forms of art is yet rather limited. On the subpect of such meaning see LANGER, PHI-
LOSOP3HY IN A NEw KEY (1946).
8. In social reality word and sense are related to each other in a manner similar to
that which-in the opinion of English Judges (22 How. St. Tr. 301)--obtains between a
letter and its sense. "Your Lordships ask us"-they answered to the House of Lords
in 1789--" 'whether the sense of the letter be matter of law or matter of fact?' We
find a difficulty in separating the sense of the letter from the letter. The paper with-
out the sense is not a letter." There can be no word without sense but at best a
sound, figure or gesture, singly or in combination. Let the generic term for sounds,
figures or gestures, or their combination, be called a "symbol," it being understood
that "symbol" in this context does not "symbolize" anything. A symbol becomes a
word by virtue of interpretation which institutes it a symbol for something, invests
it with meaning. There is no meaning and hence no words apart from and prior to
interpretation. Functionally, meaning is interpretation. Since words have no mean-
ing apart from their interpretation, the possibilities of interpretation are inherently
not limited. See SmlTr, INTERPRETATION IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW, J. OF
CoMp. LEG., Series XVI (Law), No. 6, 153-164, at 153 (Montreal, 1927). In each
instance, however, when a given symbol is interpreted in a different manner from
the one in which it has been hitherto interpreted, a new word is in effect created. In
each such case the social function of the symbol as a word, i.e., as a means of com-
municating meaning, is jeopardized. Thus, it may be said that though it is possible
to assign to a symbol a large or even an unlimited number of meanings, such pro-
cedure, unless aimed at a special goal, is devoid of sense. A certain, however rela-
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from other fields of knowledge or from everyday life--says Rad-
bruch 9 -is never identical with the original meaning but is always
more precise in accordance with legal standards; it is broader, nar-
rower or entirely transformed. One may disagree with Radbruch's
generalization when applied to the substantive scope of all legal terms,
but one cannot dispute the formal proposition that in law words
primarily mean what the law says that they mean. This proposition
has two implications. In law, the "common usage" meaning of words
is not self-evident. The law determines whether "common usage" or
"legal usage," any other usage, or a specific artificial meaning should
prevail in a given case. The issue was squarely faced by Lord
MacNaghten when he declared that the opinion of judges of ac-
knowledged authority is probably a safer guide to the meaning of a
word than any definition or illustration in a dictionary.'0 Although
in another instance a court may decide otherwise," yet this very dis-
crepancy of judicial rulings shows that "meaning" is a more complex
phenomenon in law than it is in other fields of social expression.
Nor are legal references, express or implied, to the so-called "com-
mon usage" self-explanatory. Rather, they require at least a determi-
nation by some legal authority of what will be taken as "common
usage." The very statement that a word needs no interpretation be-
cause its meaning is clear, when made in legal context, has a different
scope from that of a non-legal statement to the same effect.' It implies
a choice between "legal usage" and "common usage" in the light of
which the meaning is or ought to be regarded as "clear," and a legal
and not merely social definition of the term "common usage" or "legal
usage." For this reason perhaps it may take "nine pages to determine
the scope of a statute" whose meaning is "so clear that he who runs
may read." '3 Thus, words at law even when used in a socially
tive, permanence of meaning, an established interpretation, is indispensable to the
social function of words as means of communication. It does not follow, however,
that in order to be socially useful, words must necessarily have a unique and exclusive
meaning. Nor is the use of terms of art and technical language merely a device in-
tended to serve professional interests. In the field of law it serves a real need for
precision in expressing rules of conduct.
9. RADBRUCH, VORSCHULE DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 10 (1948).
10. Midland Rail Co. v. Kettering, Thrapston and Huntingdon Rail Co. v. Robin-
son, 15 App. Cas. 19, 34 (1889).
11. The rule adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States assumes the
ordinary meaning to prevail unless a contrary indication is suggested. Jones v. Lib-
erty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 531 (1947), citing Rosenman v. United States, 323 U.S.
658, 661 (1945).
12. It should be added that even when used in a sociological sense, "clear mean-
ing" is not entirely an unambiguous concept except perhaps in a formal sense.
13. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting in United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689,
705 (1948). The decision of the majority assumed § 301(k) of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 to have a clear meaning, in fact, a meaning so clear
as to override the presumption of constitutionality.
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generally accepted sense are so used only by virtue of legal incorpora-
tion of such sense and to the extent only that such incorporation
reaches.
"Meaning" in a legal context thus being ultimately a matter of
legal fiat and not inherent in either the quality of words or in their
linguistic or social import, what words mean at law must be gathered
from rules of law governing meaning. These rules in turn may refer
to "common usage," reason, beauty or harmony, convenience or social
purpose as guides to the legal authority entrusted with interpretation.
The law may further provide for a system of reviewing interpretative
determinations with a view to testing their accordance with linguistic
or social use, their scientific or artistic quality, and in this sense it
may be said that legal interpretation is required to be grammatical,
sociological, logical, scientific or artistic. Or, the law may leave to the
enforcing authority a freedom of interpretation, and such authority
may in its discretion use grammatical, sociological, logical, scientific
or artistic methods. Thus, interpretation may be said to be scientific
or artistic. In either case, its character is primarily determined by
law.
THE LAW AS THE SOURCE OF SCOPE AND MEANING OF "MEANING"
As suggested above, the very scope and meaning of legal inter-
pretation or meaning are determined by law.
Legal interpretation is mostly limited in scope to a concrete issue
raised on the basis of the facts of a case.14 On the other hand, it is
broader in scope than other forms of interpretation, in that it also
covers those facts which are not hypothetical and variable but given
and thus themselves call for finding. What fact situation underlies
even an interpretative decision may be controversial,15 and the rela-
tive significance of facts as appearing on the record and facts as re-
stated by the court has not been clearly defined. It can hardly be dis-
puted that these are legal and not scientific or artistic problems.
The distinctive treatment of the interpretation of statutes and that
of precedents is a matter of legal fiat and not merely one of inherent
qualities of these forms of law. For inherently they are less dissimilar
than it is usually assumed. The opinion prevails that in the case of
statutes, the language, the actual words, are authoritative and the sub-
ject of interpretation, whereas in the case of judicial opinions the
14. Cf. supra, note 1.
15. A typical instance of a divergent reading of one record by different judges
may be found in United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106
(1948).
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words are not decisive but rather the ratio decidendi,1" decisional law
consisting in what the courts do rather than in what they say. As
shown above, the words of statutes are not the sole subject of statu-
tory interpretation, for they are interpreted as limited to the facts of
a case. On the other hand, it would be erroneous to assume decisional
law to. be wholly "unwritten.'T 7 True, it may be possible to derive
from a judgment in a case an entirely different rule of law from the
one announced by the court, and it may be said that the only au-
thoritative pronouncement of the court is the statement "judgment for
plaintiff" or "judgment for defendant." Yet, in order to formulate
a rule from the case it is necessary to resort to the statement of facts
as written, either as restated by the court or as found in the written
record. The record contains the "language" of decisional law. In
spite of these similarities between statutes and judicial decisions,
different principles of interpretation may be adopted for them, and
these may contribute to the difference in the meaning of statutes and
of precedents.
The most controversial problem of the meaning of "meaning" at
law is the question of what the concept "meaning of a statute" sought
to be discovered in the interpretative process actually means. Is it
the subjective intention of the legislator, or an objective meaning of
the statute itself independent of the will or intention of its maker?
In legal practice these alternatives are to a great extent expressed in
two contradictory rules: the one admits, the other rejects, preparatory
works as evidence of the meaning of statutes.
The theory of subjective legislative will assumes "meaning" to
be the sense attributed to a sentence by the speaker or writer. This
theory has been violently challenged on many grounds. The various
phases and aspects of the controversy are worth restating.
16. Said Buaaows, INTERPRETATION OF DOCUmENTS (2d ed. 1946) p. 39: "Both
statutes and judgments are sources of law, but with this difference: the actual words
of an Act constitute the law and decisions upon their construction and effect and upon
their application are authoritative; whereas in the case of a judgment it is the ratio
decidendi that constitutes the principle of law and that ratio decidendi may be ex-
pressly stated-either completely or, more usually, in relation to the issue before the
Court--or may be left unstated and to be gathered by inference from the actual lan-
guage of the judge and the effect of the decision. A rule of law may, therefore, prop-
erly and legitimately, be built up in a mosaic composed of a number of cases which
amplify, correct and explain one another, and thereby the rule emerges in a complete
form. It is a mistake, therefore, to interpret a judgment (The word 'judgment' is
here used to mean the judge's statement of his reasons) as though the words them-
selves constitute the law, and judges have often protested against general words used in
one connection in a judgment being taken as an authority for a different set of facts
which were not before the judge at the time and consequently were not in his mind."
It should be added that even where the ratio decidendi is expressly stated in the opin-
ion, it does not necessarily follow that this ratio decidendi set forth by the judge is
binding.
17. Bentham, as is known, pointed out that there is more writing in "unwritten
law" than in "written law."
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Meaning or intention has been said to have a different import
when referring to a will, a contract, or a statute. Whatever language
a testator may have chosen in expressing his intention, it is this
subjective intention and not its expression which is alleged to be the
ultimate object of inquiry.' 8  In contracts, on the other hand, the
element of reliance by the addressee is taken into account, and mean-
ing is taken to be not what the promissor had meant but what the
promisee can justifiably expect the promissor to have intended or
meant. Attention is thus directed to the objective meaning of lan-
guage. This is in contrast to statutes, where, unless they have been
judicially construed and reliance placed upon such construction rather
than upon the statutory terms themselves, the risk of interpretation
is born by the addressee. An argument frequently advanced in favor
of the objective theory of meaning within the sphere of statutory in-
terpretation is that, realistically speaking, there is no such thing as
a subjective intent or meaning, i.e., a "will," of the legislator. This
argument has been so often repeated that it has come to be regarded
as a jurisprudential truism. According to Wurzel, it applies even in
cases of laws emanating from one person, as for instance, an absolute
monarch, for he "would have to be a professional lawyer even to know
the titles and general contents of the many laws and ordinances
promulgated in his name." "9 Speaking of the problem of legislative
will in a representative democracy, Wigmore pointed out 2 that "an
actual legislative will" does not exist either in the voters at large, or
in the legislators as a body. Only an infinitesimal number of the
voters are beforehand acquainted with the terms of a particular bill,
and they cannot "will" what they do not know. So far as the legisla-
tors are concerned, in nine cases out of ten, they do not know or care
about the terms of the bill for which they vote. In the last analysis,
therefore, the only actual legislative will is the will of a few individuals
belonging to the drafting committee.
18. Powell, Construction of Written Instruments, 14 IND. L.J. 199, 207 et seq.
(1939), distinguishes between wills and inter vivos declarations of trust, on the one
hand, and inter vivos conveyances not involving trusts and contracts, on the other.
The former set forth ideas and desires of one person, and the task of the interpreter
is like that of a theologian interpreting Scriptures, complicated by the fact that often
these instruments are drafted by persons other than the testator or settler. But see,
e.g., Gray v. Pearson, 6 H.L. Cases 61, 106, 10 Eng. Rep. 1216, 1234 (1857), where
Lord Wensleydale said in a concurring opinion: "The expression that the rule of con-
struction is to be the intention of the testator is apt to lead into error, because that
word is apt to be understood in two senses, viz., as descriptive of that which the tes-
tator intended to do, and of that which is the meaning of the words he has used. The
will must be in writing, and the only question is, what is the meaning of the ivords
used in that writing."
19. Wurzel, Methods of Juridical Thinking, in ScIENcE OF LEGAL METHOD 286,
352 (1921).
20. Wigmore, The Judicial Function, Editorial Preface to ScIENcE OF LEGAL
METHOD, xxvi at p. xxxii (1921).
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The Supreme Court of the United States has applied an even
more stringent standard of what constitutes legislative will. It has
taken the realistic position of admitting as evidence of legislative will
utterances of only such persons who have actually and not merely
constructively influenced the passage of a bill, and only such utterances
which unequivocally demonstrate the position taken by the legislature.
It thus denied evidentiary value concerning the meaning of a statute
to statements of a legislator who was not a member of the Judiciary
Committee which reported the bill in question and who did not vote
for its passage. 2 It declined to consider the fact that Congress had
failed to amend a bill where the proposed amendment was not reported
out of committee, so that it did not appear whether the amendment
was thought unnecessary or undesirable.2 It declared a report not
previously submitted to members of the committee and contradicted
without challenge on the floor of the House by a ranking minority
member to be of little weight.2 3 It refused to take notice of committee
changes of a bill made without explanation, on the ground that the
reasons for such changes are entirely speculative, and that "the inter-
pretation of statutes cannot safely be made to rest upon mute inter-
mediate legislative maneuvers." 24 This realistic attitude seems to
have been somewhat modified in a recent decision inferring an inten-
tion of Congress from an exhibit which the members of Congress can
hardly be presumed to have read.25 In international law, the issue
of whether or not preparatory works are admissible seems to depend
on the question of who are the parties to the litigation. Subject to
certain reservations, the Permanent Court of International Justice
held preparatory works in general admissible.2" It excluded such works
in cases in which some but not all the parties to the litigation were
among the original signatories of the treaty under construction,
21. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 276 (1947).
22. Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Swan, 329 U.S. 52G, 529 (1947).
23. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & P.R. Co. v. Acme Fast Freight, 336 U.S. 465
(1949).
24. Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 61 (1947).
25. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), and see particularly Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion criticizing the lack of realism of the majority view
(at pp. 44 et seq.). Cf. also Hilton v. Sullivan, 334 U.S. 323 (1948), where the Court
considered not only statements of the sponsor and the active proponents of the statute
under construction, but also those of hostile witnesses testifying before the Senate
Civil Service Committee. The latter statements were used to show knowledge of
Congress that a certain interpretation would be placed on the Act (pp. 338, 339).
In Transcontinental & Western Air v. C.A.B., 336 U.S. 601, at note 6, pp. 605, 606
(1949), the Court read a statute in the light of the Conference Report of a previous
bill which was not passed on the ground that the clause subject to interpretation
crystallized in that Report.
26. For cases supporting the general rule admitting preparatory works see
SORENSEN, LES SOURCES DU DROTT INTERNATTONAL, RTUDE SUR LA JURISPRUDENCE
DE LA COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE (1946), pp. 215 et seq.
27. See judgment of the Court in the case of the International Commission of the
Oder, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 23.
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the reason being that a party cannot be taken to have had an intention
in the formation of which it did not participate. Thus, the meaning
of a treaty may vary in accordance with the personalities of the liti-
gants.
More extreme opinions entirely reject the doctrine of the sub-
jective intent or meaning of the legislators, and refuse to look behind
the words of a statute under any circumstances. They accept a posi-
tion akin to that contained in the parol evidence rule of private law.
This is the position followed in England."8 Its underlying idea is a
particular conception of the nature of democratic procedure. Accord-
ing to it, a statute speaks with the voice of the three Estates of the
Realm and the meaning which the draftsman or any other member
attaches to it cannot affect its construction and effect.2 9 In the United
States the reverse rule is advocated as flowing from the principle of
separation of powers. The controversy is here formulated in terms
of the antithesis of "libre recherche" by judges and legislative intent
as found in preparatory works. In a famous dispute between Radin 31
and Landis,"1 the latter took the position that "The Anglo-American
scheme of government conceives of law-givers apart from and at times
paramount over courts," and that hence the contention "That a dis-
coverable intent [of the legislators] . . . is irrelevant to the judge
• disregards not only theoretical but practical considerations of
Anglo-American government." 2 In Germany the doctrine of the ob-
jective meaning of statutes was occasionally advocated on the absurd
28. The rule was laid down in England in 1881. When the case of R. v. Bishop
of Oxford, 4 Q.B.D. 525 (1879), came before the Court of Appeal the judges referred
to the speech of Lord Chancellor Cairns in the House of Lords, for assistance in
elucidating the policy and meaning of the Public Worship Regulation Act of 1874.
For this they were rebuked by Lord Selborne, S.E. Ry. Co. v. Railway Commis-
sioners, 50 L.J.Q.B. 201, 203 (1881), and the rule is now settled in England that
courts may not seek the aid of parliamentary debates, reports of Royal Commissions,
or other preliminary documents, when interpreting the meaning of obscure words of
statutes. Smith (supra, note 8, at p. 156) pointedly remarks: "Lord Halsbury even
committed himself to the paradox of asserting that the draftsman of a statute was the
worst possible person to interpret it, apparently because he actually knew what it
meant."
29. Re Dean of York, 2 Q.B. 1 (1841).
30. Radin's position is stated in Statutory Interpretation, 43 HAnv. L. Rv. 863
(1930), and in A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARv. L. Rnv. 388 (1942).
31. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARv. L. REv. 886 (1930).
32. Id. at 886, 887. Radin at first took the position that "When the legislature
has uttered the words of a statute, it is fhnctus officio, not because of the Montes-
quieuan separation of powers, but because that is what legislating means." Statutory
Interpretation, note 30 supra, at 870. In A Short Way with Statutes, note 30 supra,
he relies rather on principles of constitutional history in the light of which the Amer-
ican statute is neither the continental "law" (loi, Gesetz), which is the lineal de-
scendant of the Roman-canonist lex, nor the same as the English statute emanating
from a sovereign. There is hence, in Radin's opinion, no primacy of legislation over
the judiciary in the American law, and no reason to look for the intent behind the
statute like a theologian might seek the intent of the Scriptures.
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ground that "the statute may be more intelligent than the legisla-
tor." m
The theory of subjective legislative will, however, has one clear
advantage as against the theory of objective meaning. Its scope is
less indefinite. It aims at grasping the understanding placed upon
a statute by a limited number of persons, the legislators, whether as
individuals or as corporate body. The question of what the objective
meaning of a statute is, per contra, has never been clearly answered
or even formulated. Meaning being concurrent interpretation, and
thus a means of communication, whose concurrent interpretation is
the objective meaning if it is not that of legislators and addressees?
Is it the meaning attributed to a statute by everybody or by a par-
ticular group, such as judges, lawyers or businessmen, or are the
groups of persons whose interpretation is determinative varying in
accordance with the type of statute under consideration? Is it the
interpretation of contemporaries of the enactment only or also that of
later generations? Whose sense is the "ordinary and natural sense"
if it is not the ordinary and natural sense of legislators and addressees?
Some of these questions, of course, also arise within the framework
of the rule providing that the subjective intent of the legislator governs
meaning. But then they can be answered if it is shown that the legis-
lator had an intention with respect to the particular question and
what that intention was. For instance, the legislator in a particular
instance may intend that a word should be interpreted according to
its meaning current among businessmen, in another instance, that it
should be interpreted in the light of historical or in the light of future
development, etc. Where recourse to the intention of the legislator
is barred, these questions arise as independent general problems, and
unless a particular statute in its wording or a particular system of
law suggests an answer to them, they remain open questions. The
foremost American advocate of the exclusion of preparatory works,
Professor Radin, significantly avoids this initial problem of objective
33. Thoel, cited by Gmelin, Dialecticimn and Technicality, in SCIENCE op LEGAL
ME oD, 85, 98 (1921). In his recent book, VORSCHULE DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE,
Radbruch bases the objective theory of meaning on the following reasoning: "Juristic
interpretation is directed toward the objective meaning of positive law, i.e., to the
meaning expressed in the rule of law itself, not to the subjective meaning, i.e., the
idea of the persons participatiog in its creation. Therein lies the difference between
juristic interpretation and philological interpretation. Philological interpretation is
re-thinking of an idea thought before . . ., juristic interpretation, on the other hand,
is drawing ultimate inferences from a thought (zu Ende Denken des Gedachten). For
jurisprudence is a practical science, and must give an immediate answer to any legal
question and cannot deny decision on the ground of gaps, contradictions and obscuri-
ties of the statute. Therefore, it must understand the statute better than did the per-
sons who participated in its creation, derive from it more than these persons put into
it." However, preparatory works are used in interpreting statutes in Germany. Cf.
Erbe, Der Gegenstand der Rechtsvergleichung: XIV Z. r. AUSL. U. INTERN. PRIVAT-
RECHT, 222 et seq. (1942).
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statutory meaning by shifting the attention of the judge to "the pur-
pose of the statute as a whole" and to judicial feeling about the value
of that purpose.34 What the purpose of a statute is, to be sure, may
be also a subject of controversy, as for instance evidenced by the
"purpose" of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 in the
light of the majority and dissenting opinions in Trailmobile Co. v.
Whirls.5  And "statutory policy" as interpreted by a court majority
may be declared "questionable" by the minority, as seen in Algoma
Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board.3
Nor can the purpose of a statute be legally dissociated from its words,
unless some other method of ascertaining such purpose is suggested.
All these methods are in reality methods of decision praeter or contra
legem, 7 in the light of which the function of statutes becomes question-
able. One might just as well disregard the statute entirely, and decide
on the basis of an appropriate social factor, such as industrial custom
or custom of trade, as an independent source of law. 8
On the other hand, it can hardly be denied that the contrary view
set forth in the theory of subjective legislative will also raises serious
34. A Short Way with Statutes, supra note 30, particularly pp. 421, 422.
35. Cited supra note 24.
36. 336 U.S. 301, 318 (1949).
37. See text at note 4 supra, on sociological interpretation.
38. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330
U.S. 148 (1947), which held trainees not to be "employees" within the meaning of
the Fair Labor Standards Act, found that "Congress never intended to regulate the
subject at all," and hence refused to base his determination of the case on the inter-
pretation of the Act, and relied rather on the "good faith understanding of the parties
following a long-established custom of an industry whose labor relations have long
been subject to collective bargaining" (pp. 155, 157). In Bay Ridge Operating Co.,
Inc. v. Aaron et al., 334 U.S. 446 (1948), the majority, speaking per Mr. Justice
Reed, rejected the argument that under the Fair Labor Standards Act "an agreement
reached and administerd through collective bargaining is more persuasive in defining
regular rate than individual contracts," and refused "to give decisive weight to con-
tract declarations as to the regular rate because they are the result of collective bar-
gaining" (at p. 463). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting (pp. 477 et seq.) brahded
the majority's adherence to the words of the statute as "legal dialectic" and stressed
the social reality of industrial customs and the importance of considering the actual
relation of economic forces in any given case. For "The Fair Labor Standards Act is
not a legislative code for the government of industry. It sets a few minimum stand-
ards leaving the main features in the employment relation for voluntary arrangement
between the parties" (p. 486). In Transcontinental & Western Air v. Civil Aero-
nautics Bd., cited supra, note 25, the question before the Court was whether § 406 (a)
of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, which empowers the Civil Aeronautics Board
to fix and determine the fair and reasonable rates of compensation for the transporta-
tion of mail by aircraft and "to make such rates effective from such date as it shall de-
termine to be proper . . ." confers upon the Board authority to make the rates
retroactive beyond the date on which an air carrier's petition was filed. The question
was decided in the negative. The majority, speaking per Mr. Justice Douglas, held
that the clause cited above "does not necessarily mark a departure from the customary
pattern of fixing rates prospectively," and that the "make effective" clause "was inserted
only to make clear that the rates could be made retroactive to the date of the applica-
tion" (p. 758). Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, said (p. 760) : "I see no justifica-
tion for holding that this language means anything less than just was it says ..
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juristic difficulties. Although "collective intent" in the light of modern
psychology 3 9 is not as unrealistic a concept as it is made out to be by
jurists, there still remains the problem of reaching or expressing such
intent by means of available legal methods. However, this problem
is not peculiar to the theory of legislative will but arises whenever a
psychological element is at issue in law. The law does not solve such
issues but rather shifts them.4"
It is not the purpose of the present paper to suggest a solution
of the conflict between the theory of subjective legislative intent and
that of objective statutory meaning. Nor could proof of the exclusive
"correctness" of either theory be made on a jurisprudential basis, for
legal correctness, i.e., validity of any such theory is not ultimately
determined by jurisprudence. Possibly, the conflict of the two theories
is less marked than it would appear to be at first impression.4 ' If
existent, however, -it can be legally expressed and solved solely in
terms of legal rules admitting or rejecting preparatory works as
evidence of statutory meaning. It hardly needs elaboration to show
that a rule of that type is not a perfect corollary of any philosophical,
psychological, sociological or linguistic concept of "meaning."
Roughly assuming the rule admitting preparatory works to cor-
respond to the theory of subjective intent and the rule rejecting such
works to correspond to the theory of objective meaning, it becomes
evident that the choice between the two theories of meaning is ulti-
mately a matter of legal fiat and not a scientific or artistic quality of
meaning itself.
39. One of the foremost exponents of modern psychology, Sigmund Freud, recog-
nizes the reality of psychological experiences of groups or masses. See MASSENPSY-
CHOLOGIE UND IcH-ANALYSE.
40. The statement that preparatory works are legitimate sources of law because
the intention of the legislator governs meaning is a political statement. In order to
express a legally correct thought, the relation must be reversed: the intention of the
legislator governs because and to the extent that preparatory works are legitimate
sources of law. Indeed, in law the term "intention of the legislator" is merely a
figurative expression of the rule admitting preparatory works in evidence.
All allegedly psychological phenomena in the law are to a larger or smaller ex-
tent "constructive." Legislative intent is "constructive" intent. From constructive
intent only one step leads to "representative" intent consisting in proving the intent of
a group by putting in evidence expressions of certain individuals.
41. Since the law can express meaning solely by enacting a legal rule, the ques-
tion is posed whether there may be rules which unequivocally point to the theory of
subjective intent or to that of objective meaning. This question must be answered
in the negative. Preparatory works might very well be used to show objective mean-
ing. Other legal rules may serve as indicia of either theory. Whatever the nature
of subjective intent which may be discovered by the use of preparatory works, such
intent may be also reached by evidence of surrounding circumstances and rules of con-
struction. Since the circumstances surrounding the enactment of a statute were pre-
sumably known to the legislator, they are an incidental link connecting the under-
standing of the latter and that of the addressee. Thus there is no absolute contradic-
tion between "subjective intent" and "objective meaning."
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EFFECTIVENESS AND DESIRABILITY OF LEGAL RULES OF
INTERPRETATION
As seen from the preceding sections, a minimum law of interpre-
tation is an essentiale of any legal system. The problem of the effec-
tiveness and desirability of rules of interpretation arises only with re-
spect to individual rules. The distinctive quality of these rules as
against other rules of law consists in that they are applicable not in-
dependently but only in conjunction with other rules whose meaning
they serve to specify. Their merit consists in that they are general
rules which in specifying simultaneously the meaning of numerous en-
actments, promote economy of legislative or other documentary lan-
guage, and assist in disposing of ambiguous and unforeseen cases.
An apparently most convincing argument against legal rules of
interpretation is that advanced by Wurzel.42 His main proposition is
that "true" rules of interpretation are meaningless, for a legislator
cannot by legislative act ultimately impose a manner of reading his
will upon the subjects of his commands. If a legislative command
is ineffective, because it is misunderstood, "the legislator may sup-
plement it by a new command, differently expressed." It is not within
his power, however, to compel or increase "comprehension" of his
commands.
There is no denying the fact that the human possibility of con-
veying ideas by means of language is limited,43 and that no rule of
interpretation can overcome that ultimate limitation of language as
a means of communicating ideas of speaker or writer to an addressee.
The proposition advanced here is merely that even in those cases where
this limitation does not apply, linguistic possibilities being adequate,
it may be impracticable within reasonable confines of time and space
to specify the meaning of each of the innumerable statutes and other
documents to the fullest possible extent. Rules of interpretation can
substitute for potential numerous specific linguistic expressions. As
thus understood, there may be meaningful legal rules of interpreta-
tion.
44
When are such rules meaningful? When they impose not only
a type of comprehension, an end effect of interpretation, but a method
of arriving at such comprehension. Expression or possibility of ex-
42. Wurzel, Methods of Juridical Thinking, op. cit. supra, note 19, at 306, 307.
43. Said Lord Halsbury in Tubes v. Perfecta Seamless Steel Co., Ltd., [1903] 20
R.P.C. 96 (1902) : "I doubt whether any one of us has not more than once found that
human language is but an imperfect instrument for the expression of human thought.
44. Wurzel's argument is to a large extent a terminological one. He distinguishes
between "true" rules of interpretation and rules of law disguised as rules of inter-
pretation, and thus in effect rejects the idea of interpretative legal rules.
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pression in terms of method rather than in terms of substance is
a feature which legal rules of interpretation share with other rules of
law. All true rules of law are ultimately rules of procedure. They
instruct what action is to be taken or how a certain result is to be
reached.
The problem of the effectiveness of rules of interpretation can be
subdivided into two questions: Can a rule of interpretation increase
comprehension? Can any other desirable end be attained by the use
of specific rules?
The first question is predicated upon understanding of the mean-
ing of "comprehension." But comprehension is an ambiguous con-
cept. Ordinarily comprehension consists in invoking in the minds
of the speaker or writer and of the addressee identical or similar ideas
or experiences. As seen from the preceding section, however, in mat-
ters of statutory interpretation, comprehension may have a different
meaning. Under the theory of the objective meaning of statutes, the
ideas and experiences of the speaker, the legislator, are irrelevant, and
nothing definite is substituted for them. For the purpose of simpli-
fication it will be assumed that the theory of subjective intent prevails.
The complication introduced by the theory of objective meaning will
be dealt with later.
Assuming comprehension to have the ordinary meaning stated
above, it is submitted that a rule of interpretation can serve as a code,
a common tool, of the draftsman of a statute or other legal document,
and of the person applying such statute or document. In order to
serve as a tool of comprehension, such rule must be known to the
speaker or writer and to the addressee, and it has been aptly stated
that "the rules are really laid down for the guidance of the draftsmen,
and we may reasonably assume that the draftsmen do their work with
these instructions in mind." " Binding rules of interpretation enable
the draftsman to know in advance at least how the addressee will
proceed or what sources he will use in his search for the intended
meaning of the document at issue. It may be assumed that he formu-
lates the rule accordingly. It is not contended here that all doubts
concerning the meaning of words can be resolved by the use of rules
of interpretation. Only some types of cases can be disposed of in
advance. In others the scope of misunderstanding can be narrowed.
A few cases decided in recent years may be used to illustrate this
proposition.
In the case of the United States v. United Mine Workers of
America " the question before the Court was whether the term "per-
45. Smith, supra note 8, at 155.
46. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
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sons' as used in the Norris-La Guardia Act included the Government
of the United States. The question was answered in the negative
on the basis of the rule of construction that a sovereign is presump-
tively not intended to be bound by its own statute unless named in it,
and on the basis of the Court's interpretation of the common usage
of the term "persons." But there was a vigorous denial of the de-
cisive force of the rule of construction, and of considerations based
on the alleged common usage of the term "persons." '7 The doubts
would have been conclusively resolved at the time of drafting, had
the draftsmen been then aware of the existence and binding force of the
rule of construction adopted by the court, in other words, had this
rule been known to be a rule of law rather than a so-called "canon
of construction."
In Federal Power Commission v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
Co.4 the question was whether the Federal Power Commission had
jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act 49 to prohibit a gas company
engaged in interstate commerce from selling its leases. The Court
held that the Commission had no such jurisdiction, the result being
inferred from a specific exception to Commission authority contained
in Section 1 (b) of the Act which reads in part as follows: "The
provisions of this Act . . . shall not apply . . . to the production
or gathering of natural gas." The majority, speaking per Mr. Jus-
tice Reed, held this language to be unambiguous. "Of course"-
it said 5 -- "leases are an essential part of production." Said Mr.
Justice Black, in dissent:
I agree with the Court that this language is "unambiguous"
and that this Court should give the language its "clear and
natural meaning." "Production" of gas would thus mean the
act of bringing forth gas from the earth, and "gathering" would
mean the act of collecting gas after it has been brought forth.
Such are the "clear and natural" meanings we had heretofore
attributed to these word symbols. [Citations]. It was the physi-
cal acts incident to the "production and gathering" of gas-local
activities-that our prior decisions emphasized Congress intended
to leave states free to regulate.5 '
There is nothing unusual about a controversy over a meaning
which both majority and minority regard as "clear." But neither is
the underlying issue incapable of a general solution. The real question
47. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, supra note 52, at 307 et seq.,
and particularly at 314 et seq.
48. 69 Sup. Ct. 1251 (1949).
49. 52 STAT. 821 (1938), as amended, 56 STAT. 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq.
(1946).
50. Supra note 48, at 1256.
51. Id., at 1262, 1263.
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is: Does a term having clear meaning mean only what it says or also
all the incidents of what it says? That question might be answered
differently with respect to statutory enabling clauses and with respect
to exceptions from such clauses. In any event, the answer could be
formulated in abstract terms in such a way as to afford guidance for
legislators and judges.
When a word has both a technical and a common meaning, a
binding rule of interpretation providing that a particular one of these
meanings should prevail unless express provision is made to the con-
trary would be most salutary. In Crane v. Commissioner 5 the ques-
tion before the Court was whether the term "property," as used in a
statute providing for taxation of gain or loss on property acquired by
devise on the basis of its fair market value at the time of its acquisi-
tion, is or is not the same as "equity." The Court, Justices Jackson,
Frankfurter and Douglas dissenting, held that it is not. Speaking
for the majority, Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, relied in the first place
on the dictionary meaning of the word "property":
The only relevant definitions of "property" to be found in
the principal standard dictionaries are the two favored by the
Commissioner, i.e., either that "property" is the physical thing
which is a subject of ownership, or that it is the aggregate of
the owner's rights to control and dispose of that thing. 3
It is instructive to compare an instance of Mr. Justice Holme's
use of the term "property." Writing informally to Pollock," he
said:
A patent is property carried to the highest degree of ab-
straction-a right in rem to exclude, without a physical object
or content. It is matter reduced to Boskievitch points.
Obviously, there is a legal use of the term "property" which does
not attach to a physical object at all. Perhaps, had the draftsmen
of the statute at issue in the Crane case known that the dictionary
meaning of "property" was to prevail, they would have made a careful
study of dictionary meanings, and possibly chosen a different term.
It can hardly be denied that comprehension of legislation is in-
creased if legislators and judges use the same dictionary. Rules of
interpretation can provide them with it. It is not essential that the
same type of dictionary be adopted for all statutes. It may be desir-
52. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
53. The Court cites the following dictionaries, supra note 52, at 6, n. 14: WEB-
STER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED, 2d ED.; FUNK AND WAGNALS'
NEW STANDARD DIcTIoNARY; OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY. None of the legal dic-
tionaries was consulted, and neither was WORDS AND PHRASES.
54. Hoi.-AiEs-PoLLOmc LETTERS 53 (Howe Ed. 1946).
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able to adopt different types of dictionaries in accordance with the
character and qualifications of the addressees of particular statutes. 55
One might even go so far in "unusual cases" as to disregard a
specific statutory definition where it would create "obvious incongru-
ities in the language," and "destroy one of the major purposes" of a
provision."
Nevertheless, it would be unrealistic to deny that most statutes
are drafted with a view to being interpreted by lawyers. Statistical
data on how many laymen read texts of revenue statutes might prove
revealing. But there is no reason why particular statutes or types
of statutes should not contemplate direct reading by laymen without
lawyers serving as intermediaries. In the interest of overall under-
standing, such contemplation, if any, should be made much more ex-
plicit than it is made by mere general abstention from the use of
technical language.7
True, a provision requiring statutory terms to be read in their
technical or legal rather than in their common use sense does not re-
solve all problems that may arise. There may be several technical
meanings or groups of technical meanings, such as the meaning at-
tributed to a given term by another statute and the common law
meaning, or divergent statutory meanings. More detailed rules of
interpretation, however, may be of assistance in resolving such con-
flict of meanings.
In Rutherford Food Corporation v. McComb 58 the meaning of
the term "employees" under the Fair Labor Standards Act " was
derived from social legislation of the same general character as the
Act under construction.6" The common law meaning was rejected
55. Speaking of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897 (60 & 61 Vict., c. 37),
Lord Halsbury said in Powell v. Main Colliery Co., Ltd. [1900] App. Cas. 366, at
371, 372:
It appears to me that the statute deliberately and designedly avoided any-
thing like technology. I should judge from the language and the mode in which
the statute has been enacted that it contemplated what would be a horror to the
mind of the lawyer, namely, that there not be any lawyers employed at all, and
that the man who was injured should be able to go himself and say, "I claim so
much," and that then he should go to the county court judge and say, "Now
please to hear this case, because my employer will not give me what I have
claimed." It appears to me that that is the meaning and construction of the whole
statute, and that is what the Legislature intended, and that is the reason why it
avoided any technical phrases. It strikes one at once that, if anything of a tech-
nical application or a technical commencement of the litigation was intended, the
Legislature was competent, and had sufficient knowledge to say what it meant.
56. See Lawson v. Suwanee Fruit & Steamship Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 503, 504 (1949).
57. Courts accept the contrary proposition as guiding principle. Compare the
cases cited in note 11, supra.
58. 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
59. 52 STAT. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 207.
60. The Court said (supra note 58, at 723, 724) : "The Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, enacted June 25, 1939, is a part of the social legislation of the 1930's of
the same general character as the National Labor Relations Act of July 5, 1935, 49
STAT. 449, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., and the Social Security Act of August 14, 1935,
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on the ground that "the Act concerns itself with the correction of
economic evils through remedies which were unknown at common
law." 61 In Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co.,"2 on the
other hand, in construing a provision of the Emergency Price Control
Act, 3 the Court rejected the argument that interpretation applied to
a similar provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act "' should be con-
sidered as binding, on the ground that a power granted by the former
Act "is not dependent on the provisions of another Act having a his-
tory of its own." The cited cases can be reconciled, and general rules
of construction evincing from them formulated as follows: Statutory
terminology prevails over common law terminology in cases of statutes
enacted in derogation of the common law. However, the meaning
attributed to a term by a statute governs only in the case of another
statute of the same general character, and not in the case of one
having a history of its own. If followed in other cases, such rules
can develop into common tools for statutory draftsmen and judges,
and can increase understanding among them, just as the existence
of. general rules can increase certainty of the law. Had the rule
enunciated in the Rutherford case been known to the draftsmen of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, they would have closely studied the in-
terpretation of the terminology of the National Labor Relations Act
and the Social Security Act before using the term "employee."
In cases of two conflicting statutes, the intended solution of the
conflict could be best established if at the time of the enactment of the
later statute a rule of construction were in existence disposing of con-
flicts of that nature in the absence of a contrary provision. In Levin-
son v. Spector Motor Service " the question before the Court was
whether "checkers" or "terminal foremen" were exempt from the
overtime compensation provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
under the clause of that Act rendering it inapplicable to "any em-
ployee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission
has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service
pursuant to the provisions of section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act,
49 STAT. 620, 42 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq. Decisions that define the coverage of the
employer-employee relationship under the Labor and Social Security acts are per-
suasive in the consideration of a similar coverage under the Fair Labor Standards
Act. See National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111
(1944) ; United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947)."
61. Citing the opinion of the Circuit Court, 156 F.2d 513, 516, 517 (10th Cir.
1946).
62. 331 U.S. 111 (1947).
63. 56 STAT. 23, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. Supp. V, § 901 et seq.
64. § 4(b) and (c) of that Act, 52 STAT. §§ 1060, 1061, 1062 (1938), 29 U.S.C.
§ 204 (1946), as interpreted in Cudahy Packing Co. of Louisiana v. Holland, 315 U.S.
357, 788 (1942).
65. 330 U.S. 649 (1947).
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1935." 66 The Court said that "Congress has prohibited the over-
lapping of jurisdiction of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division, United States Department of Labor, with that of the In-
terstate Commerce Commission as to maximum hours of service,"
and resolved the conflict in favor of the latter agency.
In the Court's view, the Fair Labor Standards Act incorporates
by reference not only the provisions of the Motor Carrier Act but
also the regulations issued under it by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, which is thereby empowered to determine the scope of the
incorporating act. If the result of the decision were generalized, the
underlying rule could be expressed as follows: A statutory incorpora-
tion of a provision of another statute also incorporates future ad-
ministrative determinations issued under it. Whatever its intrinsic
merits or shortcomings, had such rule of construction been in existence
at the time the Fair Labor Standards Act was under discussion, and
known to its draftsmen, they would have been forced to face and re-
solve the issue which was to arise almost a decade later. The words
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, if formulated with knowledge of
the rule, would have been a clear indication of the intent of Congress
to let the Interstate Commerce Commission's safety program prevail.
Another conflict most frequently involved in matters of statutory
interpretation is the intertemporal one between the meaning as pre-
vailing at the time of the enactment of the statute and that accepted
at the time of its application. In Packard Motor Car Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board"6' the Court held foremen to be "employees"
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act 6 and en-
titled to unionize. While approving of the political result of the de-
cision, Mr. Justice Douglas dissented, pointing out that at the time
the Act was passed foremen were undoubtedly not included within
the term "employee." " Similar problems arise in determining
whether automobiles are "vehicles" under laws enacted before the
invention of automobiles, requiring towns to maintain roads in good
repair for vehicles; and whether phonographic discs are "copies" of
music entitled to protection under a statute enacted before the phono-
graph was imagined. 0 These questions invoke the broader one of
whether the legislator, 'though unaware of the future existence of
such devices, can be said to have "intended" automobiles or phono-
graphic discs to be covered, and thus pose the problem of the proper
66. 52 STAT. 1068 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §213(b) (1) (1946).
67. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
68. 49 STAT. 450 (1935).
69. Supra note 67, at 496.
70. These examples are cited by Wigmore in The Judicial Function, op. cit. supra
note 20, at p. xxxvi.
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meaning of the term "legislative will" in general. This problem has
been discussed above. Suffice it to say in the present context that
in those cases in which the legislator contemplates development, the
existence of a rule of construction imposing either a historical or a
contemporary reading of statutes unless a contrary meaning is shown
to have been intended, would give the legislator occasion to express
his intention concerning future developments of meaning.
The foregoing examples demonstrate the effectiveness and de-
sirability of rules of interpretation as means of increasing comprehen-
sion within the scope of the doctrine of subjective legislative will.
Such rules establish a contact between the speaker or writer, i.e.,
the legislator, and the addressee of the enactment.
The problem of increasing the measure of comprehension is some-
what complicated when posed within the framework of the theory
of objective meaning. For instance, without resort to the will of the
legislator it may be difficult to ascertain the group of persons to
whom a statute is addressed, or whose comprehension is desired. As
long as such initial problems are not solved, no complete answer can
be expected to the question of the extent to which comprehension can
be increased by means of rules of interpretation. However, it is only
the "degree" of the increase in comprehension that cannot be estab-
lished. Comprehension, being a similarity or identity of ideas of the
persons involved (whoever they may be), must be capable of being
increased to some extent by formulating a method of communication,
a code, binding them. In fact, rules of interpretation may assist in
solving the above indicated initial problems. Under the extreme
version of the doctrine of objective statutory meaning, rules of inter-
pretation may be the only guarantee of comprehension.
In summarizing it may be said that whatever the meaning of
"meaning" within the realm of statutory interpretation, its compre-
hension can be increased by rules of interpretation. Of course, abso-
lute certainty can never be reached, but the scope of misunderstanding
can be considerably narrowed.
Turning now to the problem of the effectiveness of rules of in-
terpretation as means of reaching goals of interpretation other than,
or supplementary to, an increase of comprehension, two functions of
such rules are worth emphasizing: Assistance in disposing of unfor-
seen cases, and forcing potential future issues upon the minds of
legislators.
No rule of interpretation can foreclose the existence of the "un-
foreseen case" and the problems it invokes. As soon as the unfore-
seen case arises and becomes known, however, a pre-existing binding
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rule of interpretation serves as a tool of resolving doubts concerning
coverage vel non of the case by a statute, and by accelerating compre-
hension decreases the likelihood of litigation. If as a result of the
interpretative rule, the unforeseen case does not appear to be satis-
factorily disposed of, recourse will be taken to legislation rather than
to litigation.
Quite frequently future cases are perfectly well foreseen and never-
theless not resolved in advance because of misunderstanding between
the several draftsmen as to the prevailing interpretation, or because
the draftsmen are not sincerely keen on solving the ambiguity of the
bill. An example is afforded in the case of the United States v.
United Mine Workers of America.1 When the bill at issue in the
case was before the House, Representative Blanton, of Texas, intro-
duced an amendment which would have made an exception to the
provision limiting the injunctive power "where the United States
government is the petitioner." Representative La Guardia opposed
the amendment not on the ground that such an exception should not
be made, but rather on the ground that the express exception was
unnecessary, the meaning of the statute being clear. Mr. Blanton's
answer was that Mr. La Guardia "does not know what extensions
will be made." The debate shows that the case was anticipated, and
that the meaning of the bill was controversial even at the time of the
debate.72 Perhaps the proponents of the bill unconsciously were try-
ing to avoid a clear solution. Had the rule of construction which
later afforded the basis for the decision been known as a rule of law
at the time of drafting, the draftsmen would have been forced to face
the issue squarely instead of dodging it, as they did. In this instance
also litigation would have been avoided.
Quite generally it may be said that, whether by increasing com-
prehension or otherwise, legal rules of interpretation introduce an
element of certainty into the law.
A distinguishing feature of legal rules of interpretation as com-
pared to scientific or artistic rules consists in the fact that the capacity
of the former rules to perform their various functions is not ulti-
mately dependent on the intrinsic reasonableness or convincing power
of the rules themselves. These rules are artificial, and they are
effective even if they are otherwise unreasonable. If the law contains
a direction imposing the application of such rule, the objection that
the rule is not true, or unwise, or does not conform to habits of
71. Cited smipra note 21.
72. The relevant parts of the debate are restated in the opinion in the case, supra
note 21, at p. 277.
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speech, is foreclosed. By virtue of being valid as legal rules, rules
of interpretation become "true" in a twofold sense: (1) they are
"true" in the legal sense of being binding irrespective of their intrinsic
qualities; and (2) they become actually true as between legislators
and judges, for they become habits of legal speech or communication
between them. They are "true" in the same sense in which a code
is true. An example may illustrate the proposition set forth here.
Professor Radin 7' criticizes the rule providing that the expression of
one thing is the exclusion of another (expressio unius exclusio
alterius) as being "in direct contradiction to the habits of speech of
most persons," hence, as "not true." " This observation is perfectly
correct when applied to the cited rule as a principle of hermeneutics
or as an artistic rule. Once the same rule becomes a rule of law,
however, it is irrelevant whether or not it is otherwise "true" or
wise. It is valid, and therefore true as between the draftsman of a
document and the judge interpreting it. Thus, no matter what its
intrinsic merits or demerits, it accomplishes its ultimate function of
enabling the judge to understand the meaning of the document in-
tended to be conveyed by the draftsman. It serves as a code, and the
"true" or natural meaning of words used in a code is not relevant.
PRACTICABILITY OF ADOPTING LEGAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION
In the last analysis, rules of interpretation are methods of in-
creasing legal certainty. However, one of the most frequently en-
countered arguments against their validity sets forth the intrinsic
uncertainty of these rules themselves.
The plain meaning rule above all has been subject to this
criticism.7" Plain meaning has been said to be the result rather than
a guide of interpretation, 7 and the paradox of describing something
73. Statutory Interpretation, supra note 30, at p. 873.
74. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Justice Murphy, in Brooks v. United
States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), holding the enumeration of exceptions in a statute (the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680) as excluding other potential excep-
tions, stated (at p. 919): "Without resorting to an automatic maxim of construction,
such exceptions make it clear to us that Congress knew what it was about when it
used the term 'any claim.'"
75. In Caledonian Rail. Co. v. North British Rail. Co., 6 App. Cas. 114 (1881),
at pp. 131, 132, Lord Blackburn stated that he agreed completely with the proposition
that the ordinary meaning of words should prevail, adding "but unfortunately in the
cases in which there is real difficulty, it does not help much, because (they) are
those in which there is a controversy as to what the grammatical and ordinary sense
of the words, used with reference to the subject-matter, is."
76. Radin, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 30, at 869, states: "As a matter
of fact, in most cases when courts say that a statute is plain and therefore needs no
interpretation, they do so in the inverted fashion which marks so much of the judicial
process. They have already interpreted, and they then declare that so interpreted the
statute needs no further interpretation."
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as plain which it takes nine pages to explain has been emphasized."
This criticism is undoubtedly correct when applied to the plain mean-
ing rule in its present stage of rationalization. So far as future pos-
sibilities of the rule are concerned, however, the criticism is subject to
limitations. This may be seen from a comparison with the argu-
ment advanced in reference to the concept constituting the contradic-
tory opposite of "plain," the rule concerning "uncertainty" or "in-
definiteness" of statutes. In Winters v. People of State of New
York,7" holding a section of the New York Penal Law void for in-
definiteness, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion,7 after
pointing out that "indefiniteness" is "itself an indefinite concept,"
proceeded to demonstrate how that standard may and did acquire
definite shape in the course of interpretative decisions, indicating "the
directions to be followed and the criteria to be applied." 80 Although
the criteria cited by Mr. Justice Frankfurter from opinions delivered
by Mr. Justice Holmes bear on the contents of the statutes at issue
rather than on the concept of "indefiniteness" in the interpretative
rule itself, they may be and in the argument of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter are used to narrow down the meaning of the latter rule.
Similarly, a collection and comparison of cases dealing with plain mean-
ing may in due course endow with definiteness the plain meaning rule
itself, and render it effective as a rule of law.
It has been frequently pointed out, however, that apart from
the intrinsic indefinitness of the individual rules of interpretation,
indefiniteness results from their accumulation. It has been repeatedly
alleged that these rules neutralize each other, that for each such rule
a contradictory opposite may be cited, so that in effect there is no
binding rule at all.8'
This imperfection of interpretative rules is frequently only ap-
parent. There would seem to be circuitous reasoning, for example,
in accepting the principle that words must be interpreted in the light
of the intention expressed, and at the same time, the principle that
77. See note 13 supra.
78. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
79. Id. at 520, 524, 525.
80. Id. at 537.
81. Lauterpacht, Les Travaux priparatoires et l'interpretatlion des trait~s in 48
ACADFMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 711, 713 (1934) says: "There is no author whose
name is more frequently mentioned before international tribunals than is Vattel, and
in Vattel's treatise there is no chapter more frequently cited than the seventeenh of
the second book, where the author gives a complete list of rules of interpretation. In
Dractice, this long list of rules of interpretation has been much more noticeable by
its lack of pertinence and its excessive artificiality than by its actual utility. It is
difficult to imagine a case in which a State could not, in order to support its claims,
rely on one of the rules of interpretation elaborated by Vattel. Upon analysis, the
majority of these rules neutralize each other." Compare Wurzel, supra note 19, at
309, 310; Radin, supra note 76, at 880.
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the intention is to be ascertained from the words used in a document.
When analyzed in terms of procedural rules, the two propositions lose
all appearance of such reasoning. They mean (1) that a document
must be read as a whole, (2) that extrinsic evidence is not admis-
sible.8 2 It must be admitted, however, that in many cases the con-
tradictions cannot be resolved in this manner, so that the original chal-
lenge remains to be answered.
The argument that rules of interpretation can be mostly neu-
tralized and are therefore not true legal rules originated in continental
Europe, and is being uncritically repeated in the common law coun-
tries. True, two contradictory rules contained in one statute or code
afford no guidance whatever, unless some method of reconciliation
can be established. Where, as in continental Europe, precedents are
not binding, decisional law cannot effect a permanent reconciliation.
Thus, the rules of interpretation, as received and incorporated in the
codes, are preserved in continental Europe in the same form in which
they were taught by the Roman jurists, as an unsystematized collection
of wisdom. In countries of the common law, however, the fact that
a rule has a contradictory counterpart is not a necessary bar to its legal
character. The entire system of the common law is a system of
selecting among opposing rules that which is most appropriate to a
given fact situation. In the course of this process rules of conflict
are formulated which govern the choice of opposing rules, circumscrib-
ing and delimiting the sphere of validity of each to defined fact situa-
tions. It may be assumed that if this process of the common law
were permitted to function in the sphere of legal interpretation, it
would have developed in due course a body of interpretative precedents
of a legal character comparable to that of other common law
precedents. But where particular types of decision are believed to be
based on merely scientific grounds as contrasted with legal grounds,
their law-creative operation is impeded. English and American jurists
took over from the continental civilians their version of canons of
constructionY. At the same time, they accepted the civilian belief
that interpretation is not law. Indeed, they seem not to be aware of
the fact that they possess in the common law method a tool for de-
veloping the rules of interpretation into Law, a tool not available to
continental jurists.
82. BURROWS. op. cit. supra note 16, at 6, finds a reconciliation of the two rules
in the fact that "There is rarely a difficulty in ascertaining the general intention of the
writer when the document has been read as a whole."
83. Schiller, Roman Interpretation and Anglo-American Interpretation and Con-
struction, 27 VA. L. REv. 733, 767 (1941). Anglo-American Jurisprudence has paid
little attention to hermeneutics. Elaborate schemes of canons of construction such as
that of Rutherford have been "practically borrowed outright from continental
civilians."
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In recent years the Supreme Court of the United States enun-
ciated several rules governing the choice of conflicting rules of in-
terpretation. In United States v. Brown"4 it held that "the canon
in favor of strict construction (of penal statutes) is not an inexorable
command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose,"
and the same principle was clearly applied in Kordel v. United States.s"
In United States v. Sullivan 6 it held that the plain meaning rule
overrides the rule requiring the court to avoid construing an Act in
a manner which would raise grave doubts as to its constitutionalityY7
Moreover, this point of the decision was cited as precedent in Shapiro
v. United States 8' in which the Court said "The canon of avoidance
of constitutional doubts must, like the 'plain meaning' rule, give way
where its application would produce a futile result, or an unreason-
able result 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a
whole.' "89 It is important to note that the rules of conflict in the
Sullivan and the Shapiro cases are not coextensive, so that invoking
the rule of the former case in deciding the latter can mean only that
the proposition that there are rules of conflict is thereby recognized as
having the force of a precedent. The cited rules of conflict are formu-
lated in terms of sweeping generalizations. The relations of the various
rules are fixed in an abstract manner. The method of the common
law, however, requires that each rule be predicated upon specific facts
as distinguished from others which in turn may generate another, con-
flicting rule. The rationalizing process leading to such distinctions is
still outstanding. But it should be borne in mind that the law of the
conflict of rules of interpretation is of very recent origin.
When the effort of creating effective rules of interpretation by
rationalizing interpretative decisions is taken into account, the argu-
ment may be made that the issue of interpretation is shifted rather
than solved in the course of such rationalization. Rules of interpreta-
tion may be said to increase rather than reduce interpretative prob-
lems by adding to them the issue of interpreting the rules of interpreta-
tion themselves. The answer to this argument is that shifting an issue
is not a fatal defect as long as the issue is thereby narrowed. The
nature and purpose of rules of interpretation, as defined in this paper,
consists in their ability to serve as economy devices. They substitute
for numerous documentary elaborations of meaning an abbreviated
84. 333 U.S. 18, 25 (1948).
85. 69 Sup. Ct. 106 (1948).
86. 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
87. Id. at 693.
88. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
89. Id. at 31. The rule of the Sullivan case is cited in the margin, note 40.
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general elaboration covering all of them. Should any such rule itself
raise interpretative problems, under stare decisis such problems could
be decided in a single case. As thus clarified, the rule could then
effectively perform its function of assisting in the disposal of many
other potential cases.
The preconceived idea that rules of interpretation are not and
cannot be legal rules resulted in the fact that hardly a decision can be
found which is exclusively based on a particular rule of interpreta-
tion. This fact in turn has been used as another argument against
the legal character of such rules. It has been said that these rules
are never contained in a square holding but are mostly set forth as
supplementary grounds of decision, and that therefore they cannot be
discovered and formulated by the usual methods of the common law.
Indeed, it is said, they are never true reasons of judicial decisions
but rather rationalizations of decisions previously reached and de-
rived from indeterminate sources, mostly of a psychological nature.
Again, it may be interesting to note that the last mentioned proposi-
tion has been set forth in the now waging controversy concerning the
operation of precedents as applicable to all rules of the common law.
The first mentioned challenge is a more serious one. However, it may
be directed only at existing law, and leaves the possibility of develop-
ing a future law of interpretation intact. There is nothing inherent
in the nature of a rule of interpretation which prevents it from being
used as sole or as determinative ground of decision. Recent decisions
seem to indicate that in resolving doubts increasing weight is being
given to interpretative rules, and the inception of a law of interpreta-
tion seems to be noticeable.9"
It is quite difficult, however, for this development of American
law to reach the stage of a conscious process. This is explainable on
the basis of the peculiar jurisprudential distinction which is drawn
between rules of construction and rules of law. Once a rule of con-
struction is used as a sole or determinative ground of decision, it is
likely that it will operate as a precedent. When it operates as a
precedent it is no more referred to as a rule of construction but is
described as a rule of law. The theory is thus preserved that there
are no legal rules of interpretation. Closely connected with this is the
distinction that is drawn between words which are mere means of
90. In United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947),
the trend toward acceptance of binding rules of interpretation was rather clear. In
turn, the interpretative proposition advanced in that case was the predominant ground
of decision in United States v. Wittek, 69 Sup. Ct. 1108 (1949). See also United
States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440 (1947), decided on the authority of the construction
of Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold & Silver Mining Co., 93 U.S. 634 (1877), assumed to
be binding in United States v. Morrison, 240 U.S. 192 (1916).
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transmitting meaning and words which are constitutive parts of a legal
transaction, or ceremonial words. As soon as a certain interpretation
becomes legally associated with definite words, the road is open for
these words to be used as constitutive parts of the contemplated trans-
action, with the result that no other worcfs will be admitted to bring
about the same legal effect. Again, the interpretative character of
an ensuing judicial determination is lost, the claim being made that
the court is faced with an "act" not a true "word" and that only
words are proper subjects of interpretation. What may seem to be
merely a matter of mistaken terminology actually obstructs the de-
velopment of a law of interpretation. Awareness of the true nature
of rules of interpretation is thus not a mere problem of juristic nicety.
Just as a verbal act does not cease to be a word by virtue of the fact
that a fixed legal consequence becomes attached to it, so an inter-
pretative rule of law does not cease to be a rule of interpretation by
virtue of acquiring the force of law.
There remains the problem of determining the exact stage at
which a rule of interpretation may be said to have acquired the force
of law. In the case of interpretative statutes 11 this problem is solved
in accordance with formal criteria. The general standards determi-
ning the question of whether a legislative enactment is in force are
also applicable to interpretative enactments. In the case of interpre-
tative decisional law the standards of the validity of rules are rather
flexible. The general flexibility of such standards in the field of de-
cisional law 92 is further complicated in the field of interpretative de-
cisional law by the above described reluctance of those entrusted with
interpretation to accept interpretative decisions as precedents. Per-
haps, due to this fact, there will be developed in the field of interpreta-
tive decisional law standards of what constitutes a precedent more
stringent than those prevailing in other fields of law. The emergence
of decisional interpretative law of some sort, however, is an undeniable
fact.
93
91. Statutes dealing with principles of interpretation are collected and cited in 9
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2938, note 3 (3d ed. 1940).
92. Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 Sup. Ct. 301, 337
(1949).
93. In United States v. United Mine Workers of America, supra note 90, at 272,
273, Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for the majority, said:
It has been stated, in cases in which there were extraneous and affirmative
reasons for believing that the sovereign should also be deemed subject to a re-
strictive statute, that this rule [the rule that he is not subject to such statute un-
less expressly mentioned in it] was a rule of construction only. Though that may
be true, the rule has been invoked successfully in cases so closely similar to the
present one, and the statement of the rule in those cases has been so explicit, that
we are inclined to give it much weight here. Congress was not ignorant of the
rule which those cases reiterated; and, with knowledge of that rule, Congress
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LAW OF INTERPRETATION AS SOLUTION OF JURISPRUDENTIAL
PROBLEMS
Acceptance of a law of interpretation will prove to be of assis-
tance in resolving many troublesome problems which are usually ex-
pected to be answered by jurisprudence as a science or philosophy of
the law. Are there gaps in the law? Is the analogy argument a
proper method of disposing of cas~s not explicitly covered by a legal
provision? And if so, does the admission of analogy also cover the
device which Wurzel calls projection? " Is the argumentum a con-
trario, the rule of expressio unius exclusio alterius, or that of ejusdem
generis a proper mode of reasoning? Jurisprudence explains the
working of any such rule or argument; and hence may be consulted in
the course of accepting or rejecting any such device in those instances
in which the making of future law is at issue. But the question of
whether or not any such device is valid as Law is to be determined
not by jurisprudential generalizations but on the basis of the particular
legal system involved.
One legal system may adopt the rule that there are no gaps in
the law, i.e., that all future cases are provided for, so that if a fact
situation does not fit into any of the existing legal provisions, no ac-
tion or remedy will lie.95 Another legal system may adopt the op-
posite rule, i.e., assume itself to be incomplete. It may further con-
tain provisions for a particular method of filling its gaps, or even for
an order of priority among the various methods of filling such gaps.
One legal system may admit analogy as a valid method of arriv-
ing at a decision, another system may exclude it. Furthermore, within
the same legal system there may be fields in which analogy is admis-
sible and other fields in which it is not.9" It is also possible for a
legal system to adopt a particular type of analogy, as for instance,
analogy to a definite statute, but reject another type, such as analogy
drawn from principles of an entire legal scheme.
The same is true of the "problem" of projection. As presented
by Wurzel, this method of law-creation would seem to be inherent
in "juridical thinking." m' Therefore, it deserves elaboration. Wurzel
would not, in writing the Norris-La Guardia Act, omit to use "clear and specific
[language] to that effect" if it actually intended to reach the Government in all
cases.
Has the decision ground of the case become a rule of law by virtue of that very
case? There is hardly any doubt that it has advanced in the direction of becoming
one. United States v. Wittek, supra note 90, practically confirms the legal character
of the rule of construction advanced in the Mine Workers' case.
94. Note 19 supra, at 342 et seq.
95. The rule "No gaps in the law" is tantamount to "Judgment for the defendant"
in all cases not provided for in the law.
96. In criminal law analogy is generally excluded. But see the Danish Penal
Code of 1930.
97. Supra note 19, at 344 et seq.
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describes "projection" as "extension of a concept found in formulated
law to phenomena which were not originally contained in the concept,
or at least were not demonstrably a part of the group of images form-
ing the concept, without at the same time changing the nature of the
concept as such." By way of illustration, Wurzel cites the extension
of a statute passed in 1700 imposing a tax on mills "run by machine
power" to steam or electric mills, although in 1700 by "machine
power" one had no idea of anything except machines driven by wind
or water. The application of the statute to steam or electric mills-
Wurzel claims-is neither subsumption nor analogy, and would be
permissible even if the statute prohibited extension by analogy, for the
nature of the concept "machine power" need not be changed in order
to apply it to steam machinery. "There is no gap, we can apply the
concept immediately and directly; we attach the new phenomenon to
the old concept as an integral part, although it was not originally
contained in it-in short we project the old concept into the new
phenomenon."
It is evident that whenever projection is applied, there is an un-
derlying assumption, whether express or tacit, that words are to be
interpreted in accordance with their meaning as prevailing at the
time of application rather than in accordance with that obtaining at
the time of the enactment of the statute at issue. It is perfectly im-
aginable that a legal system should exclude such assumption and pro-
hibit law-creation by projection, or that it should prohibit such law-
creation for particular cases or types of cases. There is nothing in-
herent in "juridical thinking" which imposes such method of law-
creation upon all legal systems or upon the disposition of all types of
cases within any such system. As between the rule imposing historical
reading and that imposing contemporary reading of legal language,
the law is the first source of determining the choice, and the law may
formulate a general rule imposing the one or the other reading upon
all statutes or upon parficular statutes as distinguished from others.
Similarly, the question of whether any of the numerous rules of
construction, such as expressio unius exclusio alterius, ejusdem
generis, etc., is applicable must be decided on the basis of existing law
adopting or rejecting any such rule as a general principle or for par-
ticular types of situations.
As suggested above, however, law-makers concerned with the
shaping of future law will always have to consider policy arguments
in the sphere of the law of interpretation as in other fields of the law.
Examples of policy argiments which may be advanced de lege ferenda
are set forth in the following.
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Although legal rules of interpretation may successfully serve their
purpose, whether or not they are otherwise reasonable or true, from
the point of view of policy, in introducing such rules into the law,
reasonable rules are preferable to unreasonable ones, for the former
will be more readily accepted and followed.
Many rules of interpretation are not merely means of transmitting
meaning but are also independently law-creative. This factor must
be considered. Thus, when a potential general rule of interpretation
accepting or rejecting projection is discussed, it should be remembered
that the type of rule adopted affects the development of the law. An
important policy argument against projection will be the following:
In letting the meaning of a statute as prevailing at the time of its
application govern rather than that accepted at the time of its enact-
ment one actually makes law dependent on contingencies of linguistic
development which does not necessarily coincide with the spirit or
purpose of the statute.9"
The problem of the intrinsic reasonableness of particular rules
of interpretation must be distinguished from that of the reasonable-
ness of adopting rules of interpretation at all within particular branches
of law, e.g., decisional law. As shown in the first section, the differ-
ence betwen the nature of statutory law and decisional law is much
less pronounced than is generally assumed. Nevertheless, from the
point of view of policy concerned with the "growth of the common
law" in the accepted forms of the common law, one might very well
argue that it would be better to dispense with rules of interpretation
and the incident certainty within the field of decisional law. No posi-
tion is taken here with respect to that point. Within the field of
statutory law the policy situation is insofar different from that prevail-
ing in decisional law as the former law presupposes a prior policy
determination that statutory law is preferable to decisional law in
situations governed by statute. Such a determination implies that the
statute be administered as meant.
In this connection it is important to distinguish the problem of
whether or not rules of interpretation should be applied to the body
of law known as decisional law from the problem of whether rules
of interpretation themselves should be-decisional or statutory. The
present writer is inclined to favor decisional interpretative law. Any
law of interpretation will have to cope with the jurisprudential preju-
dice that interpretation is not and cannot be law. Decisional law is
better equipped to perform the educational function of overcoming this
prejudice than is statutory law.
98. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the spirit or purpose of
the statute is also expressed in words which have a changeable meaning.
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CONCLUSION
There can be no law without a law of interpretation, for even the
maxim of "free interpretation" presupposes legal authority of judges
to interpret freely, and possibly also their legal duty to interpret rea-
sonably. Interpretation being thus primarily a matter of legal fiat,
the issue of legal interpretation is narrowed down to the question of
whether or not specific rules of interpretation should be adopted. These
rules have been attacked on various grounds. Their logical possibility
and practical effectiveness have been challenged. At the same time,
no suggestion has been advanced for a constructive substitute for
them.
The recent expansion of statutory law and the increasing use of
written documents in modern life give weight to the argument in
favor of adopting legal rules of interpretation, for the essence of docu-
ments lies in their meaning, and rules of interpretation are means of
increasing the probability that documents will be applied as meant.
It is hoped that some of the challenges have been rebutted and that
it has been shown in positive terms that legal rules of interpretation
are logically possible, that they may be practically effective, and that
adoption of such rules is desirable. The effectiveness of legal rules
of interpretation can be increased by juristic consciousness of the legal
character of such rules. Such consciousness may be promoted by a
restatement of the law of interpretation.
